The aim of involving state members in reforming federal constitutions is to guarantee them the autonomy that they have been constitutionally granted. It also prevents reform from being carried out unilaterally by the central government and means the structure of competences can be modified as necessary. In this study, we will consider how federations manage, to a greater or lesser extent, regional intervention in constitutional reform.
Introduction: federalism and constitutional reform
If, according to Ackerman (1998: passim) , the greatest constitutional changes often take place as a response to extraordinary situations or in deep crisis periods in which there is a great social movement to foster constitutional change, it can be said that in Spain, we are immersed in such a certain 'constitutional moments'. The territorial issue, worsened by the economic crisis and the pro-independence challenge in Catalonia, is probably the central matter regarding the large amount of reform proposals to the Spanish Constitution and it justifies the analysis in depth on the constitutional reform in Spain. However, unlike it seems to be usual among Spanish academics I , we are not going to focus on the reform contents but on the subjects involved; specifically we are going to try to settle whether the Autonomous Communities' participation in the reform is appropriately guaranteed or not in such a way that there are certain mechanisms that allow to update and improve the competences granted by the Constitution to these subnational entities.
This participation, as we will show in this section I, is a constituent element of Federal 1993: 229) , think that Spain can be included within this model. Next, and in light of comparative law, we will classify and describe the various methods for involving the territorial entities in constitutional reform so as to find out which of them implies the greatest guarantee of federalisation (section II).
Finally, we will focus on the Spain's unique model. In this case, the formal channels for the Autonomous Communities involvement in constitutional reforms are clearly unsatisfactory, as we will see in section III.
The individual states' involvement in constitutional reform is considered as one of the greatest contributions of the United States to the constitutional experience; this along with the fact the constitution is rigid and written, as well as the federal structure itself (La Pergola 2016: 188 and Blanco Valdés 2012: 107-112 ). What's more, if, as Loewenstein said, all the legitimate holders of power need to participate in constitutional reform because 'the wider this involvement, the broader the consensus of constitutional reform and the greater its legitimacy' (Loewenstein 1986: 172) , this hypothesis is at its strongest in federal countries. 
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Here, the regional governments' contribution to constitutional reform has been described as one of the defining elements of this phenomenon by many authors II . Groppi has gone so far as to say that a federal constitution that only allowed itself to be revised through centralised procedures would be 'a contradiction in terms' (Groppi 2001: X) .
It is with good reason that 'we have federalism only if a set of political communities coexist and interact as autonomous entities, united in a common order with an autonomy of its own' (Friedrich 1968b: 11) . For this reason, a federal constitution must fulfil precisely the function of defining each of these singular identities and integrating them into State organisation, placing at their disposal areas of wider or narrower autonomy. Regardless of to whom sovereignty must be attributed in this State model, a matter on which there has much debate in the past III , and of the way it should be established, be it by aggregating preexisting sovereign states (integrative or aggregative federalism) or by breaking down a unitary State (devolved or disaggregative federalism) IV , the basic structural principle of a federation is the existence of separate autonomous spaces of the common order. Here, the constitution attributes each of these regional governments (federative entities), their own sphere of competence. This is the only rule that governs the political existence of them all. This principle of autonomy, as shown by González Encinar, is defined as a compromise between centrifugal and centripetal trends in which a set of relations of coordination, participation, supraordination and subordination occur between the State organs (González Encinar 1985: 89 and 95) . The form this takes is a type of collaboration and vertical division of power (Cámara Villar 2004: 211) .
Beyond this structural principle of autonomy, the federation is an indefinable truth V (unless, like Wheare, we reduce it to the American federal model VI ) because of the huge organisational differences between the different federal countries. The pitfalls of case selection can be particularly a problem in the comparative study of federalism. The number of federal states is not very large and it can diverge depending upon how one counts (for instance, 4 according Wheare VII or 25, in Watts' opinion -see Watts 2008: 24-28) . With Abat and Gardner (2016: 382-383) , we can agree that a rigorous working definition of federalism helps assure the similarity of states compared but can reduce the validity of inferences because of the small size of both the sample and the universe. A more inclusive definition allows more powerful and far-reaching inferences, but carries a risk of inaccuracy by sweeping in sample variation that the analysis may not take into account. In this work, 
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we have opted for a generous criterion. We expect that the limited objects we are comparing, only the rules relative to the amendment of federal constitutions, could minimise the risks. We are going, therefore, to include in our sample the classic federal states (United States, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, Canada or Mexico), the new democracies refounded on formal principles of federalism after the II World War (Germany and India) or emergent federations like Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Belgium, Russia, South Africa or Nigeria. We have consciously exclude Venezuela due to the authoritarian and centralist drift that the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999 implies. Even though Italy is classified as a Regional State, we have included it because of its similarities with the Spanish system in this issue VIII .
Before we continue, we must emphasise that autonomy must be enjoyed by the common entity as well as by the regional governments. But, precisely because of this common scope, in every federation, there must be a guarantee that the individual governments will be involved in forming the unitary will of that federation. This may be through ordinary (legislation or enforcement) or extraordinary (constitutional reform)
procedure. To understand member states' involvement in constitutional reform, we need to discuss the legal relationships surrounding regional participation. The intention, as we know, is that the states are integrated into the federation and take a meaningful share of the federal power (as noted by García Pelayo 1993: 239-241).
The idea put forward by a large number of authors that the justification of this involvement could be attributed to the contractual origin of federal countries, and the fact they were formed by a confederation of independent sovereign states IX , no longer makes sense. Logically, this idea would only stand in aggregation federalism, where federative entities have replaced unanimity by majority rule (nearly always qualified) for any changes to be made to the constitutional pact. It cannot currently offer a satisfactory explanation to individual governments' requirements for involvement in constitutional reform.
A federation does not arise from a pact between previous communities, but from constituent power. That is, from the joint decision by the sovereign population to equip themselves with a federal organisation (González Encinar 1985: 84) 
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components, but as part of a united front X . As we have emphasised, this is an important element in forming the State's unitary will, but also ensures the regional governments' very survival, as it prevents their constitutionally guaranteed sphere of autonomy from being modified unilaterally by the central authority (Ruipérez 1994 : 99, Ventura 2002 : 14 and Groppi 2001 .
However, in order for these roles of integrating and defending autonomy to be fulfilled, various methods for involving the individual identities in constitutional reform have been foreseen in comparative law.
Methods for territorial involvement in constitutional reform in comparative law
From an overview of the different constitutional texts, we can conclude that in comparative law there are two main ways for regional governments to participate in constitutional reform XI : The first, which is clearly inspired by the US, is characterised by member governments participating in the reform procedure in a direct way (2.1). In the second (2.2), involvement takes place in an indirect way, when the said reform is approved by the federal parliament's second chamber. This is always defined as the House of territorial representation.
Before proceeding, we need to clarify several points. Firstly, outside of these methods, 
E -220
Looking at federalism's origins, we can see that the direct involvement of states in constitutional reform is a common method in the initial federations, which arose when independent states merged (integrative federalism). Meanwhile, in federal countries that arose as a result of the decentralisation of a unitary State (devolved federalism); participation usually takes place through the second chamber XVI .
One last point that must be made, albeit a well-known one, is that indirect participation is generally included in all federal jurisdictions. Unsurprisingly, the second chamber is always defined as the chamber of territorial representation. For this reason, we shall limit ourselves to describing federal countries where this is federal entities' only mechanism for intervening in constitutional reform.
The direct involvement of sub-state entities
Returning to the different methods for participation, we have already said that systems featuring mechanisms for territorial entities' direct involvement in constitutional reform are inspired by the United States Constitution, whose article V contains two procedures for amendment XVII . The first, which is the only one to have been used since the approval of fundamental rule in 1787, puts Congress in charge of approving amendments to the Constitution. This requires a two-thirds majority in each chamber, and ratification by threequarters of the states, either through their legislative assemblies or through Conventions created with this objective in each state. Congress also chooses the mode of ratification.
Only one amendment -number 21 of the 33 that exist currently -has been ratified through state Conventions. The second procedure is a specific national Convention proposed by two-thirds of the states that approves constitutional amendments. These also must be ratified by three-quarters of the states in one of the ways we have seen previously.
However, the greatest problem with this route for initiating reform is that it would require the proposal to be approved by a two-thirds majority in both Congress houses. This explains why this procedure -which, incidentally, was that used to ratify the Constitution in 1787 -remains unused.
As can be clearly deduced from our study of the and the last because it refers to amendments to the of the provinces' constitutions, and specifically the parts that are considered to concern the federal constitution XXIII , whose reform would be a matter for the provincial assemblies through ordinary law (article 45).
Amendments to the Mexican Constitution can also not be finalised without approval from the territorial entities. In that regard, article 135 establishes that, following a vote by a two-thirds majority of the Congress of the Union members present, any addition to or amendment of the federal constitution must be approved by the majority of the legislatures of the states. The rule does not establish the majority by which local parliaments must support or reject the amendments and, for that reason, authors have stated that this should be determined in the constitutions of the states, and if it is not, a simple-majority approval should apply (Carbonell 2006: 229 and 233, and Carpizo 2011: 561-562) .
The most unusual thing about constitutional reform in the Russian Federation is that approval by the Constitution's territorial entities is only required for one of the three amendment procedures. The first of the three applies to any change in the dogmatic part of the constitution when it affects the basis of the constitutional system, human and civil rights and freedoms or the procedure for reform (Chapters 1, 2 and 9 respectively). Article
Assembly, but by a Constitutional Assembly. This is composed in accordance with the law, and will either approve the proposal by a majority of two-thirds of the total number of its members or refer the matter to a referendum. A referendum would require support from an absolute majority of its voters, under the condition that over half of the electorate participates in it. The second process, which applies to any change to the organic part of the constitution (Chapters 3 to 8), would follow the procedure of a federal constitutional law -which, as stated in article 108, requires approval by a majority of three-quarters of the Council of the Federation and two-thirds of the State Duma, and in addition approval by the legislative authorities of two-thirds of the subjects of the Russian Federation (article 136). Lastly, changes to the members of the Federation or to their status only requires approval through a federal constitutional law, without needing to be ratified by the Federation's subjects. What is surprising about this legislation is that changing the essential principles of the federal constitutional order does not require ratification from the territories. Also, although their approval is expected by referendum, this takes into account the Federation's entire electorate rather than the partial electorates of each of the Federation's subjects, which would have been the appropriate procedure had they wanted to introduce an element of federal legitimacy into the constitutional review process, rather than just democratic legitimacy through a referendum which, incidentally, is not even mandatory.
Finally, changes to the Constitutions of India -although, as we have seen, only in matters affecting relations between the centre and the periphery XXIV -and Nigeria also require approval from the states' legislative assemblies. However, for India, it suffices for an absolute majority of the states to pronounce themselves in favour, whereas in Nigeria XXV the support of two-thirds of them is needed.
In Switzerland and Australia, we have said that the mechanisms for federal reform are interlaced with those of semi-direct democracy, given that there is a direct appeal to the territorial entities' citizens to conform to constitutional modifications through referendums. In this sense, although the Swiss Constitution's procedure for reform changes significantly if its objective is the total or partial amendment of the said reform, in all cases, in order for the reform bill to take effect, it must be approved by the Swiss people and the people of the cantons that the country is made up of (article 195) XXVI .
The Australian Constitution states that, following a reform bill's parliamentary approval by an absolute majority, there is a period between two and six months for the citizens in each state to vote for the reform XXVII . For this to happen, it must be approved by the majority of the voters in the majority of the states, on the condition that they represent the majority of the voters in the federation as a whole. This means that in order for the reform to come into force, a double majority has to be reached: firstly, that of the states, and secondly, that of the whole of the federal country (article 128). Furthermore, if the reform aims to alter the representation of any state in the Houses or the limits of the state, a favourable vote is required from the majority of the voters of that state or the state affected by the reform.
The Italian Constitution assigns a very limited role to the regions for carrying out constitutional reform. They are not given the power to approve it; only to request a referendum for it to be approved by their citizens (article 138). Furthermore, such a referendum is not mandatory. It only takes place if, after the reform has been approved by an absolute majority, it is requested by either 500,000 citizens, a fifth of the members of one of the Houses or five Regional Councils. In addition, that option is declined and the referendum request not granted if the reform is approved by two-thirds of the Houses.
In the scenarios described up to this point (with the exception of Italy), the guarantee of federalisation of constitutional reform is clear in that it cannot be performed without the vote of a more or less qualified majority of each federation's constituent territorial entities -an absolute majority in Mexico, Australia, Switzerland and India; a two-thirds majority in Russia, Nigeria and Canada (generally speaking); a three-quarter majority in the United
States; and unanimity in Canada (for certain matters). However, is there enough guarantee of sufficient intervention from regional governments when constitutional review occurs through the House of territorial representation?
Indirect participation through the House of territorial representation
In Germany, Austria, Belgium and South Africa, the Senate is the only route for participating in constitutional reform. But, in these cases, since members' State origin does not usually have much effect on the operation of the territorial chamber, the guarantee of federalisation is quite weak. 
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The reform procedure in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany is relatively simple; the only requirements specified are that reform be carried out expressly, and that both the Federal Council (Bundesrat) and the parliament ( Rigidity is a characteristic of the Belgian Constitution (which, incidentally, is comparable to that of the Spanish Constitution's article 168). Its reform procedure is comprised of three stages. In the first, the House of Representatives and the Senate make a joint declaration on the need to revise the Constitution and the articles to be amended. Then comes the early dissolution of Parliament and the consequent announcement and holding of elections. Lastly, the newly elected reform legislator draws up the amendment, which cannot include laws other than those indicated in the initial declaration, and which in order to be passed requires a two-thirds majority vote in each House, as well as a quorum of twothirds of the members of each House. As this brief description of the procedure suggests, the Senate and the Parliament participate in reform on equal terms (article 195) XXXI .
However, despite the fact that the Belgian political system does not feature State-level Lastly, Argentina is a special case, because while in order for an amendment to be passed a constitutional convention has to be formed, the decision to approve the reform requires a two-thirds majority from the Senate. This Senate is made up of three members from each province, who are elected by a system of limited majority, and operates following a logic that is more partisan than territorial (Carnota 2016: 53). We must ask, 
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What does not differ between them is the majority by which they must approve constitutional change; in all the cases we have studied, this is a qualified majority of twothirds: Germany, Austria, Belgium (without forgetting that at least two-thirds of the members from each chamber must be present) and South Africa (six provinces out of a total of nine).
Whichever form it takes, be it direct or indirect, the truth is that when there are inadequate mechanisms for regional government to participate in constitutional reform, ordinary legislation is usually favoured, where meaningful ways of participating XXXV are planned or developed. Outside the Constitution, these may even alter spheres of autonomy that are constitutionally guaranteed. This may partially explain the limited success Spain's Autonomous Communities have had participating in constitutional reform.
Spain: shortfalls in the formal channels for the Autonomous Communities' involvement in constitutional reform
The Spanish Autonomous Communities' participation in constitutional reform is part of the general issue of constitutional reform in Spain, but has thus far played a minor role.
In this sense, the shortage of reform experiences in Spain's constitutional text should be noted. Except for some very specific aspects which occurred, even more worryingly, not on Spain's own initiative, but were imposed from the outside because of the country's membership within the European Union, amending Spain's basic rule has been impossible.
Some even speak of Spanish differential fact to describe the fact that it is impossible to turn to reform as a means of changing the constitutional text into a shifting reality (Rey E -229 recent developments in our party system, the first two political parties are incapable of. It is also because of the lack of legitimacy that would come from imposing a reform that had been cobbled together in the context of national integration crisis XXXVII .
But, on the other hand, there are several risks associated with having a Constitution that fails to change in order to adapt to reality. Firstly, if the legislator has an exaggerated interpretation of the constitutional text, or constitutional case-law is too detached from it, this may lead to the constitutional rules losing normative power, and to also noncompliance, disaffection on the part of the people or, sometimes, the direct violation of constitutional rules.
In recent years, this has resulted in the rupture of the approval model for next-wave At first glance, we might be surprised that the Autonomous Communities took this course of action since they could have carried this new layout to fundamental rule, and suggested constitutional reform directly. If we add to this the Autonomous Communities' lack of influence in the constitutional reform procedure through the Senate (or rather, in any decision made by the chamber), and this State of Autonomies' marked structural crisis, we have the full reasoning for the lack of participation. Let us now break this down.
Formal channels for the involvement of Spain's Autonomous Communities in constitutional reform
The two mechanisms by which Spain's Autonomous Communities can participate in constitutional reform are, firstly, by presenting a constitutional reform proposal and, secondly, having the Senate act as a chamber for territorial representation.
In the Spanish Constitution, direct participation in the initiative phase of constitutional reform is not actually fixed directly, but through article 166, under the provisions of articles 87.1 and 87.2, which refer to the ordinary legislative procedure. This excludes popular legislatures to directly present a proposal for constitutional reform to the Cortes Generales (the Spanish parliament).
In the almost forty years of our Constitution being in effect, on only two occasions has anybody tried to put the above procedure into action. For the moment, neither has resulted in the text being altered. The first originated in a popular legislative initiative in 1990 in which the Basque parliament was urged to present a proposal of constitutional reform to the Cortes Generales, suggesting the right to self-determination be included in the Constitution's second additional provision. But that is where it stopped because the Autonomous Community's legislature did not even consent to the matter being discussed in the Basque parliament itself, deciding that it was a matter that popular legislative initiatives were not permitted to deal with. For all these reasons, the second chamber practically doubles congressional representation, but at the second reading and with a restricted role in the legislative procedure (except in the case of the aggravated reform procedure described in article 168 of the Spanish Constitution, in which the powers of both chambers are equalled). For this reason, despite the literal wording of the Spanish Constitution's article 69.1, the Senate does not amount to a channel of expression for the territorial interests. Which, whether or not this initially made sense because of the compromise that was reached in the constituent process to not close the territorial model, it should have been corrected once the autonomous map was fixed at the beginning of the 1980s.
Lastly, it should be highlighted the fact that, the Spanish constitutional framework does not provide any other channels for intergovernmental collaboration relations that favour the participation of the different Autonomous Communities in the central State's decisionmaking process. It has been tried to make up for this absence of channels by means of several techniques and logics with a really uneven performance due to their lack of institutionalisation or even because of an uncertain legislative development thus, showing clearly the absence of any type of political interest in their implementation in some cases.
Just only, the Conference for EU-Related Affairs (Conferencia de Asuntos relativos a la Unión Europea, CARUE) or the recently reactivated Presidents Conferences (Conferencia de
Presidentes) provide some instances of collaborative practices attempts XL .
The uniqueness of the State of Autonomies: changing autonomous powers outside of constitutional reform
We have seen that when territorial entities intervene in the constitutional reform process, one of the main problems associated with the organisation of compound states is resolved: the sphere of autonomy constitutionally guaranteed to the different bodies or levels of government (that is, the territorial and functional breakdown of powers) is ensured. At the same time, the structure of competences can be modified as required (La Pergola 2016: 16-24 
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Autonomous Communities. The factors that led to this solution arise from the difficult political circumstances that surrounded the constituent process, and which led to a delicate balance being struck between the different forces. The development of this solution was deferred to a later stage through extra-constitutional rules. However, the unconstitutionalisation was not total, because in the Constitution there is a structural frame and basic principles on the subject that would have to be observed when determining the territorial structure (Aragón Reyes 2006: 75 and 78-79) . Ultimately, as Bustos Gisbert rightly says, the territorial design conducted in the Spanish Constitution is of the procedural type; it is restricted to allowing the decentralisation process, indicating the access routes for autonomy, the limits of competence and the control and closing clauses that allow conflicts to be resolved and guarantees harmony in the system (Bustos Gisbert 2006: 73) .
Nevertheless, although the Constitution does not establish the State's and the Autonomous Communities' spheres of powers, these cannot be identified unilaterally by any of the government bodies, because within the framework established by fundamental rule, agreement is needed between all parties. The most salient feature of the Spanish Constitution, which is also one of its essential characteristics, is that it has attributed to the territorial entities, which have a right to access autonomy (the 'nationalities and regions' in article 2), a decisive capacity in the set-up of the territorial structure. This has been made through the dispositive principle, which grants them at all times the powers of impetus and codecision in the federalising process XLII . This covers as much the initial part of the decentralisation process as its amendment.
At the initial stage, the dispositive principle grants representatives from the territorial entities the authority to decide whether they want to achieve autonomy (unless, for reasons of general interest, it is decided through an organic law that an autonomous initiative be taken over, as per article 144) and the authority to define, with the State, the territorial entity's power by functionally and materially determining its powers within the framework established by articles 148 and 149 of the Constitution. All of this must be contained in the Statutes of Autonomy as the basic institutional rule of each of the Autonomous Communities (article 147).
In the successive phases, the dispositive principle means that it is the Autonomous Communities who can propose and agree on changes to the defining elements of their autonomy through reform of the respective Statute of Autonomy, by means of a special
The constitutional framework's second characteristic is asymmetry. The Spanish Constitution established a territorial structure featuring Autonomous Communities which, from the outset, could access the highest competences, taking on all those powers that were not reserved to the State by article 149.1 (using article 151, or the fast track) and others that, at least for an initial five-year period, had to conform to having just competences within the narrow scope of article 148 (the ordinary route). There was, however, nothing to prevent the degree of autonomy becoming equal after the period driving the reform of its respective Statutes had passed (González Encinar 1985: 156) .
Nevertheless, the seed of that which would later result in the main problems with Spain's autonomous system can be found in the Constitution's original framework. Needless to say, the STCs (Constitutional Court rulings) on the Estatut had a significant effect on the statutory reforms' content XLVII . And although except in very exceptional circumstances this did not result in the texts being declared unconstitutional, through interpretation, the Autonomous Communities' attempts to define the allocation of competences reserved to the State by article 149.1 were disabled, which would result in only one thing: constitutional reform.
The road to constitutional breakdown in the Basque Country and Catalonia
Until this point, we have focused on attempts made by the Autonomous Communities to make informal changes to the constitutional system based on interpretations by political stakeholders, the legislator and constitutional case-law. But we are currently experiencing a drift, driven by Basque and Catalan nationalism, for which the constitutional framework is no longer sufficient. These movements are not interested, however, in constitutional reform, because they have chosen the secessionist route, therefore manifesting a clear determination for the unilateral breakdown of the constitutional order. 
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The first attempt at constitutional breakdown arose after the failure of the so-called The process in Catalonia is following a different course. As Aja reminds us, the climate generated in Catalonia by the economic crisis, autonomous financing and the long delay of the ruling on the Estatut generated an atmosphere that was favourable to independence.
This drove the autonomous powers to a secessionist process in which the first step would have to be a sustained consultation on the Catalan people's right to decide.
The Constitutional Court denied that the 'right to decide', understood as a right to selfdetermination or the right to consult on Catalonia's relationship with Spain, conformed with the Spanish Constitution. However, it did not reject the possibility of reaching independence, provided that was carried out within the framework of constitutional reform procedures, given the fact there are no intangibility clauses within Spanish basic rule. It even indicated the route that must be used for this and which, as we have seen in this study, is for the Autonomous Community's legislature to present a constitutional reform proposal XLIX . The Constitutional Court bears no relation to the informed opinion of Pedro de Vega, the strongest advocate in this field that there are implicit limits to constitutional reform, and for whom the power to revise must be exercised without breaking legal continuity, given that bringing out a revolution, which would be an act of constituent power in itself, is not permitted (de Vega 1985: 68-69) . In his words, if 'all constitutions are identified by a certain political regime and a political formula that materially defines, and socially legitimises, the legal framework, it is clear that any attempt to change the basic values making up the political formula, through the mechanism of reform, would not simply imply the substitution of articles by others, but the creation of a different political regime and the establishment of a new constitutional system ' (de Vega 1985: 285-286) L .
However, the Generalitat de Catalunya completely bypassed these decisions from the Constitutional Court and, following the illegal and unguaranteed referendum held on 1
October 2017, chose to take the route of a Unilateral declaration of independence. This declaration, to try to force the Spanish State into a negotiated exit, which was made by Carles Puigdemont, the Generalitat's President, was suspended in the first instance This situation has still not been resolved.
Conclusion
Involving regional governments in constitutional reform has the aim of guaranteeing the autonomy that has been granted to them constitutionally. It prevents reform from being carried out unilaterally by central governments and, at the same time, allows the structure of competences to be modified as necessary.
At the comparative level, two routes of intervention are envisaged: a) direct, the initiation of reform through a proposal that originates at the territorial assembly, or through a reform being approved by the assemblies or electoral bodies of the sub-state entities; or b) indirect, through the house of territorial representation. In our view, only direct participation is a sufficient guarantee of federalisation, because in reality the lower chambers are unable to function without being affected by partisan interests.
In Spain, the only way the Autonomous Communities can participate in constitutional The greatest federalisation guarantee would be achieved if, once passed the constitutional reform by the Cortes Generales, it was passed by at least the majority of the Autonomous Parliaments or, another possibility would be a referendum approved by a double majority: the majority of the Spanish people and the majority of the Autonomous Communities' voters. But the establishment of a second ratification phase requires a constitutional reform in any case.
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